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Lawyers' Work in the Menendez Brothers' Murder Trial 
Stacy Bums 
University of California, Los Angeles 
Department of Sociology 
This research addresses the interactional work by which lawyers interrogate 
witnesses at trial. In particular, the study examines some videotaped segments o f  
interrogation interchange in  the first Menendez brothers' murder trial and analyzes 
lawyer's work in attempting the impeachment of an adverse witness. The paper finds 
a lived orderliness of the courtroom that resides in the locally organized material 
detail of real-time interrogation interchange and practices. 
INTRODUCTION 
This study presents some materials from the first Menendez brothers' murder 
trial. In this research, I am trying to find a way of studying and describing a 
particular domain of phenomena which is the lived orderliness of everyday 
activities, in this case of trial lawyer's work. Significant promise for locating 
this orderliness is demonstrated in the ground-breaking studies and findings of 
ethnomethodology and conversational analysis (Garfinkel, 1967; Garfinkel and 
Sacks, 1970; Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson, 1974; Sacks, 1992; Heritage and 
Drew, 1992). 
I want to propose that there is the possibility of discovering a courtroom 
order that resides nowhere else than in the practically organized and locally 
witnessable detail of real-time interrogation interchange between lawyers and 
witnesses in court That means that we want to examine legal interaction and 
courtroom interrogation as phenomena of interest in their own right, starting 
with their everyday appearances. We will try to specify some of what is 
essential about the work in its own terms, rather than beginning with an a priori 
sociological concept and using it as a resource with which to describe the 
phenomena in terms of topics of conventional sociological significance. 
For example, we could describe the generalized roles of the lawyer and 
witness in court in terms of power imbalances or attempt to evaluate lawyer 
competency and performance. These have traditionally been the focus of 
conventional sociological analyses of legal settings. However, classic 
sociological methods and conventional analytic approaches, whatever their bent, 
have largely ignored the profound orderliness of everyday activities as members 
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know them by formulating this orderliness in the abstract analytic terms of
something else.
In contrast, I am out to explain courtroom interrogation in terms of its ov-ti
material content—that is, before it is u-ansformed into some conventional
rendering. I want to direct our attention to the contingent features and local work
of couru-oom participants in getting through just this real worldly course of
questioning this particular witness, right here, right now, in just this courtroom,
with just this judge and jury.
The focus of this talk is on some instances of lawyers' work in the
Menendcz brothers' murder trial. Specifically, we will be looking at lawyers
doing work at trial in an attempt to impeach a witness who is testifying on cross
examination. That is, the lawyer is trying to show the jury that the testifying
witness, at least with respect to some particular point of impeachment, cannot
be believed.^ What I noticed at first glance is that, whether it be the cross
examination work we will be exploring today, or writing an appellate brief, or
arguing a matter in law and motion, etc., lawyers' work is never done in general,
in theory, in principle or in the abstract. Instead, it is always directed to the
particular legal problem just then confronting the attorney. That means that for
the cross examiner, cross examination always concerns just this issue, relating
to just this testimony or pending question, within just this course of
questioning, directed to just this witness, with just this specific relationship to
the parties, within just this litigation. For trial counsel, such work in large
measure is done spontaneously and improvisationally, "on his feet," without
relief or time out to think. And, it is work not done in general, but unavoidably
in detail.
It is apparent in looking at trial work by lawyers that, characteristically, it
does not occur smoothly and rarely happens without impediment. Indeed,
adversaries routinely interpose a variety of obstacles in the way of what the
opposing side is trying to accomplish. Cross examination exchanges between
counsel and an adverse wimess provide a perspicuous setting in which to get a
clear view of the practical problems and obstacles encountered by lawyers at
work.
For this reason, I looked at lawyers doing cross examinations. That is, I
looked at counsel interrogating witnesses who were first called by the other
side—these are witnesses who typically are not inclined to cooperate with the
examiner because they are for some reason adverse to his client or case, or
because they want to establish a view of the evidence which opposes that
endorsed by the examiner, ETC.^ These are often witnesses who are
recognizable as evasive, biased, inconsistent, antagonistic, refusing to concede
the obvious, exaggerating, ETC.
The data analyzed in this study comes from televised coverage provided by a
local cable station of the first Menendez brothers' murder trial which took place
in Los Angeles criminal court from July 20, 1993 through December 15, 1993.
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The episodes pteseoted in this article were ^jecificaHy selected as significant
because they pcovolced ondCTStanding of the tactics used in ctoss examination.
The Menendez brotho^ were charged with first d^ree murder in connection
with the August 1989 shotgun killings of thdr parents, Jose Nfenendez ^
wealthy entCTtainmou executive; and his wife, Kitty Menendez. At the time of
the killings, which occmred in die family's posh Beverly Hills home, Lyle
Menendez was 21 years (^ and Eric Menendez was 18 years old. Prior to trial,
the defendants had confessed to committing parricide, but consended that the
bomiddes were justified because they were acting in self ddiense following years
ai physical and emotional abuse by both of dieir parents and sexual abuse by
thdrfatho'.
In view of the seasatioDal facts of this trial, a word of caution is in order.
As Emanuel Sche^<^ warns, '[t]here is a danger in dealing with dramatic
matCTiaL-.'[r]nteresting' very often means vemaculariy, ard not technically,
interesting [and] it may be felt that (bamatic occurrences cannot be undo^toodby
re£ezence to mundane con^draations' (Scb^loff. 198&-9. pp. 216-217). This
paper endeavors to examine two episodes firom die "specM event' of the fust
Menendez brothers' vamda trial throu^ "nmnrianfi-atoBd glasses' and tries 'to
turn a topically transiait occanence. into a source of longer lasting analytic
resources' (Ibid., p. 218).
THE EPISODES
The first of the two episodes I will discuss I have called 'Do I have posonal
inowkd^ c^ any such cases?' This cross examination is somewhat mique
because it involves die testimony of a lawyer who has been called as a legal
expert witness by die d^ense. That is, he is a legal exp^t witness retamed by
the defense, which has already caDed him on direct examination to testify on
their behalf.^
It is interesting in the practice of law that one thing yon immediatdy notice
about almost any adverse expen witness is that they are distinctly proUematic
2Bd uncocpexative witnesses on ctoss exanination. Sudi experts have
abscrfoteiy no difOculty in answering any question posed to than by the side
Much pays them and calls them to testify on direa examinatioa. Indeed, donng
direct examination they may give every cpiestion a favoiabie spin and even
answer a not-so-great question in a way which m^ces it kx^ good. However,
when the opposmg side b^ios its ooss examination, these experts saddeafy
h3yeaD extreme miouataiUoMenuidstgaiy tease at allots hdng
asked by even the simplest qoestkxL Apparently, didr expertise jadada ibe
jsaexacuooal atnlity to Fiot facilitate the questioning or assist die cross exaauner
in any way.
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Episode One: "Do I Have Personal Knowledge of Any Such Cases?"'*
P = ihe prosecutor
D = the defense counsel
W = the witness
J = the judge
P: Now you're aware of the fact, are you not, thai there are published opINions (.3) in
books such as the one that the judge showed you (.8) where (1.0) defendants use a child
abuse defense in order to justify their actions in a homicide case. (.4)
Are you aware of that?
(1.0) ((W looks to judge))
D: Yur honor I'm gonna object this is beyond the scope.
(1.0)
J: Overruled.
W: Do I have personal knowledge of of any such cases or do I believe such cases exist.
P: WeU
(.3)
W: or do I think it would be possible that such a case (.3) Could exist?
P: Well (3.0) (Oaughler from courtroom; W smiles)) Do you think it's pa-((laughter from
courtroom and ?)) hah -do you thing it's pa-no do you KNow that such cases exist?
(2.2)
W: I don't have penonal knowledge of any such case no.
What we see in this first episode is a witness who is simply not going to
straightforwardly answer the question which is posed to him. But, not only that.
We noted that this witness is a legal expert witness, i.e., a lawyer, and as a
lawyer, he has been trained to monitor ongoing interrogations by opposing
counsel so as to be able to recognize and display how a particular question is
somehow technically faulted through valid and defensible legal objections.
Thus, we see this witness as not only reluctant to assist the examiner in any
way (as with most adverse experts), but we also see that he is willing to use the
full resources of his technical legal expertise to jump all over a question and
throw every possible legal obstacle in the way of the questioner before he will
proceed to answer. The witness challenges the examiner to be more legally
precise in her questioning and we are thereby led by the witness to find multiple
ambiguities in the examiner's question, which at a first non-technical hearing
were not all that apparent or obvious.
A little background information to set up this episode is in order. At this
point in the trial, another witness, defendant Lyle Menendez's former girlfriend,
has already testified (harmfully to the defense) that while Lyle was in jail, he
asked her to go to the law library and copy certain published legal cases for him.
The former girlfriend further testified that when she looked at the legal opinions
Lyle asked her to copy, she noticed that they all involved defendants who "got
off of a murder charge after asserting a child abuse defense. The damaging
inference of this testimony was that Lyle was working on fabricating a child
abuse defense in order to "get off in this case. The legal expert in the above
episode has been called by the defense on direct examination to refute this
inference. Specifically, the witness has been called to attest to the fact that if
indeed the defendants in those cases had "gotten off (that is, been acquitted of
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murder at trial) then there would be no published appellate opinion on the case
since the bar of double jeopardy would have applied and there could have been no
appeal. (The State cannot appeal if it loses a criminal prosecution and only
appellate decisions result in published opinions).
In Episode One, the question is asked of the defense legal expert witness,
"You are aware of the fact, are you not, that there are published cases where
defendants use a child abuse defense to justify their actions in a homicide
case?..." There is about a one second pause during which the wimess looks to
the judge, perhaps suggesting that the question implicates his impending
intervention. An objection is then made by Eric Menendez's defense counsel,
perhaps prompted by the wimess' delay, that the question is "beyond the scope"
of direct examination. For our purposes, however, it only matters that the judge
overrules the objection to the pending question. So, at this point it appears that
the witness must answer the question.
I have called this episode "Do I have personal knowledge of any such cases?"
because what happens next is that the witness does not answer the question, but
instead asks this and other questions in response.^ That is, the witness questions
the question being asked. Of course, in failing to promptly and directly answer
the question as posed, the witness renders the examiner's question to be
problematic.^
The witness' response articulates how he believes the question to be legally
improper as ambiguous by showing it to be susceptible to at least three
alternative interpretations. The witness responds, "Do I have personal
knowledge of any such cases or do I believe such cases exist.. .or do I think it
would be possible that such a case Could exist?" It is notable that, by his
response, the witness demonstrates the material grounds and validity for his own
"objection" to the question, namely that it is vague and ambiguous.
The response of the witness to the question specifies counsel's inquiry as
one regarding the witness' "awareness." That is, whether the witness' awareness
is based on his "personal" knowledge of such cases or because he "believes" they
exist or because he "thinks it possible" that such a case "could" exist. One may
wonder whether the distinctions suggested by the purported ambiguity are of any
real significance—after all, what difference would it make to a jury how the
wiuiess is aware of such cases if he is in fact aware of them? Moreover, at least
according to the examiner's question, the witness was just shown such a case by
the judge, which "fact" is left unaddressed by the witness whose response does
not contest that aspect of the examiner's question.
The real import of the asserted ambiguity may be in its effect as a challenge
to the precision of the examining attorney's question. In other words, if the
cross examining attorney thinks she is going to get a suraight answer out of this
expert witness, she has now been put on notice that she is not, unless she asks a
very precise question. The interactionally achieved insertion sequence likely
occurs more as a real-time demonstration of the "hostility" of the witness, rather
than because the wiuiess does not understand or is unable to answer die
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purportedly ambiguous question as posed. This proposal is supported by the
structure of the response itself which includes a belated third ground to support
that the question is ambiguous, "Or, do I think it would be possible that such a
case could exist?"
Examining counsel appears to concede that the witness has effectively
pairied her question. There is a lack of immediate uptake by the interrogating
attorney which is marked on the video record by a smile from the witness.
Laughter is heard from the courtroom and the prosecutor joins a bit in the
laughter. The prosecutor then hesitatingly rephrases her question and indeed
twice appears to have opted for the witness' third alternative, "do I think its
possible that such a case could exist?" as follows:
"Well (3.0) ((laughter from the courtrcwm; W smiles)) Do you think it's pa-
((laughter from courtroom and P)) hah -do you think it's pa-..."
The witness' response has thus demonstrated the question to be ambiguous
and forced the examining counsel to rephrase it. In effect, the examiner's
ultimate rephrasing of the initial question ("...do you KNow that such cases
exist?") turns out to be not substantially different from her original
"objectionable" phrasing ("you're aware...that there are published Qi)INions").
After a notable silence, the wimess repeats the frame of his previous
"clarification" of the initially faulted question and responds, "I don't have
personal knowledge of any such case no."
The second episode we will view today I have named "I don't recall the exact
date." I gave the episode this name because it involves some substantial
waffling by the witness about a crucial time when she claims she had a
conversation with defendant Eric Menendez.
A little background about this episode is required. The episode calls into
question testimony given by the former girlfriend of defendant Lyle Menendez,
the same witness whose testimony was the subject of the expert witness cross
examination in the preceding episode. The questioning concerns a conversation
the witness stated she had with Eric Menendez, long before the parents' killings,
about a hairpiece that his older brother Lyle wore. The line of cross examination
challenges the witness' direct testimony to the effect that she had discussed Lyle's
hairpiece with Eric months before the homicides. If true, this would prove that
Eric knew about his brother's hairpiece long before the time he testified he first
learned about it. In other words, the current witness' testimony indicates that
Eric lied when he testified that he did not know about his brothers' hairpiece
until just prior to the parents' killings and that learning about the hairpiece when
he did was a triggering event in the series of events which he testified
immediately led up to the killings. The defense version of the facts was that
when Eric Menendez saw his mother Kitty pull the toupee off the head of his
brother Lyle days before the killings, his sudden awareness of his brother's
vulnerability and embarrassment fineed Eric to confess to Lyle his own "dirty
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secret" that their father Jose Menendez had been sexually abusing him for the
past twelve years.
Because Eric Menendez already testified that he did not know about his
brother's hairpiece until just a few days before his parents' killings, the former
girlfriend's account of when the purported conversation with Eric about the
hairpiece occurred is central to Eric's credibility and hence to the believability of
the entire defense case. Obviously, if in fact Eric Menendez already knew about
his brother Lyle's hairpiece long before he claimed he first learned about it, his
account about how and why the homicides happened would be substantially
undermined.
A series of questions concerning when the alleged conversation between the
witness and Eric took place thus become the focus of this cross examination of
the now adverse former girlfriend and are critical if Eric's attorney is to discredit
the adverse witness. It is quite notable that in response to the attorney's several
questions regarding when the alleged conversation occurred, the witness
repeatedly answers, "I don't recall the exact date," With this response in hand,
the lawyer's task is thus posed.
Episode Two: "I Don't Recall the Exact Date"
P = the prosecutor
D = the defense counsel
W = the witness
J = the judge
D: Now tell me about this time where you claim to have had this conversation with Eric
Menendez. When did you get to the house on what day of the week?
(2.5)
W: It was a long time ago I do not (.3) remember (.5) the exact Dates.
D: Well you ha- you don't even remember the month, is that right (2.0) Is that right?
W: I am I told you I do not remember the exact dates of when 1 1 visited the Menendez'
many times. F was very [long time ago.
D: [WE're only
talking about this one time Ms. Pisarcik and is it Your
testimony now that you don't remember the MONih (.3) that you
were there.
(3.0)
W: It is my testimony that I (.8) y' know don't remember the exact date.
D: I'm not asking you for the £xact ^ate. D' ya know the difference between an exact date
such as (.3) November twenty-third nineteen ninety three and the MONTh, such as (.2)
KOVEMber.
W: Yes.
K Objection [argumentative move to strike.
D: [Okay
J: Overruled.
D: Do you remember the MONTH
W: I remember approximately the time (.2) I was out there.
D: Oka:y, let's try that. What's your approximate time now
W: Well as I sss- when I stated yesterday it could have been in the spring, it could have
been A-uh (.2) I: don't know? January, February, March, April,
D: May? June? July? August.
W: No it was not that late.
((slight laughter in courtroom))
(.5)
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D: So il uh c' could've been anywhere from January through April, is that what you're
saying?
W: It could have been.
D: Well haven't we already demonstrated that it couldn't have been March or April, the
spring.
W: Y = (.3) Yes ((you have))
P: =objection argumentative your honor calls for a conclusion.
J: Sustained, the answer is stricken
D: Are you SATisfied that it couldn't have been (.2) the spring now.
P: Same objection your honor.
J: Overruled.
W: I don't know,
(3.0)
D: So tgll me what you were doing on the day that you say you had this conversation with
Eric Menendez. (.8) What were you doing?
W: I was talking to Eric.
D: Before-eh the whole day?
W: H"huh I don't remember
D: Did you wake up talking to Eric?
W: No I did not=





D: And whal'd ya do the rest of the Day.
W: I'h don't re:£all, il was a long time ago.
D: Okay You don't have to tell us it was a long time ago each time we can count. Why
[don't you just tell me
P: [((Excuse me)) Your honor I move to strike counsel's comment.
J: Ahright the ans-er the remark is stricken just ask another question please.
D: Why don't you lell me what you did (.3) at other limes on that same day.
W: I don't. (.5) Remember.
D: What were you DQing (.2) in ERic's (.3) room (.3) that day.
W: I was nfit In £iic's £oom,
D: Where were you.
W: I was in the doorway
D: And what were you doing in the Doorway to [Eric's room.
W: [I sstopped by to say Hi:, I was (.5) in the
house and stopped by to say hi,
D: [Why were you in the house.
W: [to Eric
I was visiting.
D: Wa-when you visited did you always stay inside the house.
W: Well I had to sle:ep somewhere.
D: You didn't SLee:p inside the house you slept in the guesthouse, isn't that true.
W: True:,
D: You slept in the guesthouse with LY:le.
W: Correct.
D: So you weren't in the house 'cuz you were sleeping, is that correct?
W: We:uh I was invited into the Menendez home[to spend time.
D: [Did someone
invite you into the house just before you had this conversation with Eric?
(4.0)
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The examiner's line of questioning in this episode is designed to call into
doubt the precision and reliability of the witness' memory as to when the alleged
conversation occurred and to thereby challenge the witness' credibility and the
veracity of her claim that she in fact had the conversation which is impugning of
Eric's credibility. The examining lawyer here first tries to establish when the
alleged conversation with Eric Menendez occurred. The wimess might prefer that
her "I don't recall" answers would serve to preclude further inquiry and terminate
the line of questioning on this matter (cf. Drew, 1992).
However, the efficacious examiner in this episode does not let that happen.
Instead, counsel persists with her line of questioning so as to evoke from the
witness a whole series of things that the witness "does not recall" about the
alleged conversation and the circumstances surrounding it. Thus, rather than the
witness' "I don't recall" response serving to block further inquiry, through the
work of the competent lawyer it actually becomes a vehicle for the examiner to
advance the defense position and to display the witness to be unbelievable
because of all the things that she "docs not recall."
In this episode, counsel does not allow the witness any leeway to slightly
reinterpret the questions or to answer them in any loose kind of way. For
example, when the examiner asks the witness "the Month" when the alleged
conversation occurred, the witness repeatedly responds that she "doesn't
remember the exact date." But counsel will not let the witness answer the
question on her own terms and insists instead, "I'm not asking you for an
EXACT date. Do you know the difference between an exact date, such as
November 23rd, 1993 and the MONTH, such as NOVEMBER?"
Following this, the witness concedes a bit and says "I remember the
approximate time I was out there." Counsel then adopts the witness' own
phraseology, playing off of what is at hand to earmark the uncertainty of the
testimony with a somewhat argumentative "Ok, let's try that. What's your
approximate time now?" The wimess responds, "I don't know. January,
February, March, April." It is through the use of the temporal reference "now"
that the lawyer imphes that the witness' present testimony may be different from
an earlier account and thus that it may not be credible. Counsel then magnifies
the witness' uncertainty in what we might describe to be a bearably mimicking
and mocking tempo with, "May? June? July? August."
Relatedly, after the wimess fails to provide the date when she arrived at the
Menendez house, counsel then queries, "Well you don't even remember the
month, is that right?" When the witness fails to respond to this query after a
couple of seconds, counsel insists on a response by repeating her tag question,
"Is that right?"
To paraphrase the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "the truth
withstands unending exploration" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 324).
Adversatively, counsel in this data tries to show that this witness' story cannot
withstand exploration. Over the course of the interchange, counsel demonstrates
that not only does the witness not recall the exact date of the conversation, but
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also that she does not even know what month or the time of year it happened,
what she did the rest of that day, what she was doing inside the house at the
time, or any of the other pertinent circumstances surrounding the alleged
conversation. Ultimately, the examiner shows that the only thing the witness in
fact "does recall" is that little fragment of conversation which impugns Eric
Menendez' credibility.
This episode is an excellent example of an aggressive cross examination. It
has been said that trial is a contact sport and counsel here does not hesitate to
make an open show of disbelief of the witness' statements or of her hostility
toward the witness. In this regard, do not think for a minute, that trial lawyers
go into court and comport themselves in strict compliance with the rules and
procedures of court and that they will not get up and do what they know they
should not be doing. Rather, what you often find instead is actually at the
opposite extreme: attorneys going into court, knowing absolutely what the court
rules are, knowing just where the lines of proper courtroom conduct are drawn,
and yet crossing those lines with all kinds of adversarial intent, so as to feel out
the opponent, the witness, or the judge and learn just how much they can get
away with in advocating their case. This suggests that the student of lawyers'
work cannot look solely to the formal evidentiary rules or court procedures to
tell them what makes for an effective lawyer in court.
In particular, the attorney in this episode uses the line of questioning to
publicly attack both the credibihty and reputation of the witness with some
severe mudslinging. The examining attorney is already aware that the Menendez
home also includes a guest house, which is where Lyle Menendez lived at the
time of the relevant events and where the witness stayed when she visited the
Menendez home. It is likely that the adversarial usefulness of this fact is being
held in reserve by the cross examiner, who has been waiting for the opportunity
to introduce it into evidence in a manner that maximizes its effectiveness.
The opportunity begins to arise when the witness states that she was "in the
house" and is developed by counsel who asks, "why were you in the house."
After the wiuiess' response, "I was visiting," counsel asks, "... did you always
stay inside the house." In her next response, the witness in effect walks direcUy
into counsel's trap" "W: Well I had to SLee:p somewhere."
In springing the trap, counsel simultaneously throws into question both the
morality and credibility of the witness in the exchange which follows:
D: You didn't SLee:p inside the house you slept in the guesthouse, isn't that true.
W: True:,




What you find when you look at lawyers' work in court is that the problems
presented to counsel by different adverse testimony are often similar in nature and
that likewise the ways counsel have of dealing with a particular adverse wimess
can often be used in dealing with other opposing witnesses, even though the
topic of interrogation is always different; the particular wimess, counsel and
parties are distinct; and the case issues, circumstances and specific content of the
examination interchange is always varied and unique.
That is to say, the kind of tasks posed for the lawyer by the adverse
testimony and the structure of the lawyer's work in dealing with it is still in
many ways similar—You have a witness that is not going to give you anything
helpful to your case unless you absolutely pry it out of them; they are claiming
not to recall or not to understand even your simplest question; they are
reinterpreting the question so as to specifically not provide the details that you
are obviously seeking, ETC. And these are recurrent problems which become
recognizable for lawyers and which set recognizable tasks for attorneys who are
trying to competently do their work in any actual case.
Of course, no two days or even two moments in court are ever exactly alike.
Even if counsel prepares his questions the night before, he never knows in
advance just what answers he will get, what lines of inquiry he will need to stay
on, take another crack at and further pursue with the witness. He also never
knows beforehand just what objections his questions will evoke; or how the
judge will rule on them; or how he may need to rework a question so it is no
longer objectionable; ETC.
But, despite the unpredictability and uniqueness of courtroom events and the
spontaneity of lawyers' work in court, there are times when you notice, 'Gee,
this witness is like that other evasive witness or that the lawyer's work in this
episode is like counsel's work in that other episode,' That is to say, they have
an affinity to one another.
Such findings are not based on what the analyst disengagedly bestows ot
imposes upon the exchange. Rather, you make those kinds of observations "on
your feet" based on the way that the interchange observably happens in detail;
that is, it has those orderly features in how it unfolds. This suggests a lived
orderliness of the courtroom that resides in the locally organized material detail
of real-time interrogation interchange and lawyers' practices.
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NOTES
^ The term 'impeachment' as used by lawyers is an irremediable member's gloss.
Even among lawyers, there is no uniform meaning of imi>eachment. Most broadly, it
has been defined to mean "the adducing of proof that a witness is unworthy of belief,"
(Black's Law Dictionary, p. 887). There are certain standard bases for impeaching the
credibility of a witness in court, such as by challenging the witness' ability to
perceive, remember or recount the matter about which s/he testifies or by
establishing the existence of contradictory evidence or bias, interest or other motive
to testify untruthfully (California Evidence Code, section 780). Furthermore, a
witness who is willfully false in one portion of his testimony may be disbelieved in
the whole of his/her testimony {Book of Approved Jury Instruction (BAJI), 2.22).
^ This usage of "ETC." is borrowed from Garfinkel's discussions of the "et cetera"
OToblem (see e.g., Garfinkel, 1967).
^ Direct examination is the first examination of a witness on the merits by the party
on whose behalf s/he is called (Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition). Its purpose
is to elicit facts relevant to establishing the elements of the parties' claims or
defenses in the litigation. The testimony ehcited on direct examination is regularly
edited and selectively presented to highlight, slant or exaggerate helpful facts and
accounts, while at the same time minimizing, qualifying, explaining away or
omitting harmful facts and accounts.
^ The notations in the transcripts use the conventions developed by Gail Jefferson
(1984). The principal symbols used are:
(.4) Numbers in parentheses indicate the occurrence and duration of pauses in
tenths of a second.
[ Marks the point at which overlapping talk begins.
] Marks the point at which overlapping talk ends.
= Notes the end of one utterance and the start of the next with no gap or
overlap.
Indicates the jxjint at which a word is cut off.
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(( )) Double parentheses indicate the transcriber's descriptions.
doing Indicates some form of emphasis by means of pitch.
MONTH Capital letters are used to indicate that an utterance or part of an utterance i s
produced with louder amplitude than the surrounding talk.
slee::p Colons indicate a stretch of the immediately prior sound.
.,? punctuations note falling, continuing, and rising intonation, respectively.
5 Participants regularly orient to producing adjacently paired utterances such that
upon the occurrence of the first pair part (here a question), a particular second pair part
(here, an answer) becomes relevant in the next turn (cf. Schegloff, 1972).
^ In resisting the cross examiner's questioning at this point, the expert witness uses
an insertion sequence, but modifies the features of such sequences as routinely
produced in ordinary conversation. The witness' inserted question initiates a repair
which indicates something problematic about the interrogator's preceding question
(cf. Sacks et al., 1977). The witness' response following the examiner's first pair
part question requests clarification of the purportedly ambiguous question prior to
producing the projected second pair part answer in reply. The witness' request for
clarification itself "inserts" a second adjacency pair in which the clarification
question is the first pair part and the examiner's "response" (i.e., her reformulated
question) constitutes the second pair part. Upon completion of the insertion
sequence, the second pair part answer to the examiner's original question again
becomes relevant in the witness' next turn. However, unlike in ordinary
conversation, once the insertion sequence has been responded to by the examiner
reformulating her original question, no "answer" to the lawyer's original first pair
part question will be forthcoming from the witness. Instead, it is incumbent upon the
witness to answer the question as reformulated. For the seminal treatment of
insertion sequences, see Schegloff, 1980. On the use of insertion sequences in the
courtroom context, see Atkinson and Drew, 1979. I am grateful to Andrew Roth for
his helpful suggestions on this point.
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